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STANG

v.

CITY OF MILL VALLEY

[S. F. No. 18485.

In Bank.

[38 C.2d

Feb. 21, 1952.]

P. A. STANG et al., Appellants, v. CITY OF lVIII,L VALLEY
et al., Respondents.
[1] Municipal Corporations-Torts-Governmental Functions.Fire-fighting is a governmental function, and in the absence
of statute neither a municipality nor its officers are liable in
tort for failure to discharge a duty with respect thereto.
[2] !d.-Torts-Liability Under Public Liability Act.-While the
Public Liability Act (2 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 5619; now
Gov. Code, § 53051) imposes liability where the city is using
dangerous or defective property and injury is proximately
caused thereby, it does not impose liability on a city for
failure, resulting from a clogged water pipe, to extinguish a
fire.
[3] !d.-Torts-Governmental Functions.-Failure of a governmental function involves the denial of a benefit owing to the
community as a whole, but it does not constitute a wrong or
injury to a member thereof so as to give rise to a right of
individual redress, which right must be predicated on the
violation of a duty of care owed to the injured party.
[4] !d.-Torts-Failure to Extinguish Fires.-A municipal corporation is not responsible at common law for destruction of
property within its limits by a fire which it did not set, merely
because, through the negligence or other default of the municipality or its employees, the members of the fire department
failed to extinguish the fire.
[5] !d.-Torts-Negligence in Administration of Fire Protection.
-A municipal corporation is not liable under the Public
Liability Act (2 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 5619; now Gov.
Code, § 53051) for destruction of a house by fire as a result of
a clogged fire hydrant and water main, thus making it impossible to obtain sufficient water to quench the fire, there
being no language in the statute which may be construed as
[1] Fire department as pertaining to governmental or to proprietary branch of municipality, notes, 9 A.L.R. 143; 33 A.L.R. 688;
84 A.L.R. 514. See, also, Cal.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 345;
Am.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 572.
[ 4] Liability of municipality for fire loss due to its failure to
provide or maintain adequate water supply or pressure, note, 163
A.L.R. 348. See, also, Am.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 626.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Municipal Corporations, §§ 436, 440;
[2] Municipal Corporations, § 438; [3] Municipal Corporations,
§ 440; [ 4, 5] Municipal Corporations, § 447.5.
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intending to impose a greater liability on the city than would
prevail against an individual or a private corporation charged
with negligence in the administraton of fire protection .

.APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Marin
County. Edward I. Butler, Judge. .Affirmed .
.Action against city and city officials for damage by fire
due to failure to maintain fire-fighting equipment in usable
condition. Judgments for defendants affirmed.
Charles Reach for .Appellants.
Thomas C. Nelson, City Attorney (Mill Valley) for Respondents.
Ray L. Chesebro, City .Attorney (Los .Angeles), Gilmore
Tillman, Chief Assistant City .Attorney for Water and Power,
and 0. M. Lloyd, Deputy City .Attorney, as Amici Curiae on
behalf of Respondents.
SPENCE, J.--Plaintiffs brought this action to recover damages suffered as the result of a fire on their property, claiming
liability against the city and its officials by reason of. their
failure to maintain certain fire-fighting equipment in condition
for effective use in extinguishing· said fire. (Public Liability
.Act, Stats. 1923, ch. 328, § 2, p. 675; 2 Deering's Gen. Laws,
.Act 5619; now found in Gov. Code, § 53051.) Defendants
filed a general and special demurrer to the amended complaint. The demurrer was sustained with leave to amend.
Plaintiffs declined to plead further and judgment accordingly
was entered for defendants, from which plaintiffs appeal.
Consideration of the facts alleged compels the conclusion
that the cited act does not justify the imposition of liability
upon defendants in this case, and that the judgment must
be affirmed.
From the amended complaint it appears that plaintiffs,
husband and wife, owned certain real property, with a residence thereon, in the city of Mill Valley; and that on .August
8, 1946, without their fault, a small fire ignited the roof
of their premises. Plaintiffs allege that for more than one
year prior to the fire, defendants-the city, the city manager
and fire chief-knew that the water lines leading to the fire
hydrant adjacent to plaintiffs' property, and the fire hydrant
itself, had become clogged with refuse and were incapable of
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providing sufficient water for effective fire control; that it
was the duty of defendants, and city funds were available,
to remedy that situation, but nothing was done in that
regard; that upon outbreak of the fire on plaintiffs' property,
the fire department was called and its fire-fighting apparatus
arrived in time, had water been available through the clogged
mains and hydrant, to have extinguished the fire before it
would have caused damage to exceed $25; that no other source
of water was available nor was the fire department equipped
with chemical apparatus sufficient to put out a minor fire ;
that because of the inability of the fire department to secure
water from the water mains and hydrant, the fire spread,
causing damage to the house and personal property of plaintiffs
totalling $9,563.50; that this damage was "the direct and
proximate result of the failure of defendants to discharge
their duties'' and to remedy the ''defective condition of said
public works and property.'' In joining the city manager and
fire chief as defendants, plaintiffs allege that each had control
of the fire-fighting apparatus, and had the authority and
duty of maintaining such equipment in usable condition.
[1] The determinative question is whether plaintiffs' allegations constitute a cause of action against defendants. It
is conceded that fire-fighting is a governmental function ( 63
C.J.S. § 776, p. 81), and that in the absence of statute, neither
a municipality nor its officers are liable in tort for failure to
discharge a duty arising from a governmental function.
(Miller v. City of Palo Alto, 208 Cal. 74, 75-76 [280 P. 108];
see 18 Cal.Jur. § 345, p. 1094, and cases cited; annos. 9 A.L.R.
143, 33 A.L.R. 688, 84 A.L.R. fi14.) As authority for their
action plaintiffs rely on section 2 of the Public Liability Act
of 1923, which read: ''Counties, municipalities and school
districts shall be liable for injuries to persons and property
resulting from the dangerous or defective condition of public
streets, highways, buildings, grounds, works and property
in all cases where the governing . . . board of such county,
municipality . . . or other board, officer or person having
authority to rem~dy such condition, had knowledge or notice
of the defective or dangerous condition of any such . . .
works or property and failed or neglected, for a reasonable
time after acquiring such knowledge or receiving such notice,
to remedy such condition or . . . to take such action as may
be reasonably necessary to protect the public against such
dangerous or defective condition." (Stats. 1923, ch. 328,
§ 2, p. 675.)
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[2] The ordinary case coming within the terms of this act
involves a situation where the injured person is using some
type of city property that is dangerous or defective, and
which he had a legal right to use, such as public streets
(Fackrell v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal.2d 196 [157 P.2d 625,
158 A..L.R. 625]), highways (McLaughlin v. City of Los
Angeles, 60 Cal.A.pp.2d 241 [140 P.2d 416) ), buildings (Gibson v. County of Mendocino, 16 Cal.2d 80 [105 P.2d 105]),
bridges (Bosqui v. San Bernardino, 2 Cal.2d 747 [43 P.2d
547]), school grounds (Bridge v. Board of Education, 2 Cal.
A.pp.2d 398 [ 38 P .2d 199] ) , or other similar property ( Bauman v. San Francisco, 42 Cal.A.pp.2d 144 [108 P.2d 989]).
Likewise the act sustains the imposition of liability in the
situation where the city is using the dangerous or defective
property and injury was proximately caused thereby: Pittam
v. City of Riverside, 128 Cal.A.pp. 57 [16 P.2d 768], and
Osborn v. City of Whittier, 103 Cal.A.pp.2d 609 [230 P.2d 132],
where the city negligently allowed a fire to spread from a
city dump; Durante v. City of Oakland, 19 Cal.A.pp.2d 543
[65 P.2d 1326], where the city used defective sewer pipes,
resulting in the flooding of plaintiffs' property; Knight v. City
of Los Angeles, 26 Cal.2d 764 [160 P.2d 779], where the city
negligently installed and maintained street drainage facilities,
causing an overflow on plaintiffs' property with damage to
the improvements thereon. But here the city did not create
the fire causing the damage to plaintiffs' property; rather
the claimed fault lies in defendants' failure to provide the
means for remedying a condition otherwise created-a different
set of circumstances to which plaintiffs seek to apply the act
in support of their action.
·
[3] Upon analysis, it clearly appears that the gravamen
of plaintiffs' complaint is the failure of a governmental function. Such failure involves the denial of a benefit owing to
the community as a whole, but it does not constitute a wrong
or injury to a member thereof so as to give rise to a right
of individual redress (Restatement of Torts, § 288), which
right must be predicated upon the violation of a duty of care
owed to the injured party. (Neuber v. Royal Realty Co.,
86 Cal.A.pp.2d 596, 612 [195 P.2d 501] .) [4] .A.s the maintenance and operation of a fire department is so distinguished
as a governmental function for the public good, it is ''well
settled that a municipal corporation is not responsible for the
destruction of property within its limits by a fire which it
did not set, merely because, through the negligence or other
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default of the corporation or its employees, the members of
the fire department failed to extinguish the fire.'' ( 38 .Am.Jur.
§ 626, p. 327.) This common-law rule of nonliability of a
municipality has been specifically applied in cases where the
fire loss vvas due to an insufficient supply of water because of
negligence in the upkeep of the city's waterworks system, in
that water pipes and hydrants became clogged and fell into
disrepair. (.Anno. 163 .A.L.R. 348, 356-357.) Therefore it
must be determined whether the cited statute, which is the
measure of the waiver of governmental immunity, encompasses
the liability which plaintiffs seek to impose.
Closely parallel in its facts and legal principles is the
case of Steitz v. City of Beacon (1945), 295 N.Y. 51 [64 N.E.2d
704, 163 .A.L.R. 342], where the city was authorized by charter
to construct and operate a system of waterworks and to maintain a fire department. A legislative enactment had waived
the sovereign immunity of the city, making it liable equally
with individuals and private corporations for the wrongs of
its officers and employees. Plaintiffs brought an action against
the city for damages suffered in the course of a fire which
destroyed their property. They predicated the city's liability
upon an alleged defective condition in its fire-fighting equipment arising from the failure to keep in repair .a "pressure
and flow regulating valve" in the water system, with the
result that there was provided an insufficient quantity of
water to combat effectively the fire. In holding the case to turn
on the question of "whether the facts alleged would be sufficient to constitute a cause of action against an individual under
the same duties as those impotJed upon the city solely because
of failure to protect ·property from destruction by fire which
was started by another,'' the court at page 705 succinctly said:
''There was no agreement in this case to put out the fire or
make good the loss, and so liability is predicated solely upon
the . . . provisions of the city's charter defining its powers
of government. Quite obviously these provisions were not in
terms designed to protect the personal interest of any individual and clearly were designed to secure the benefits of
well ordered municipal government enjoyed by all as members
of the community. There was indeed a public duty to maintain a fire department, but that was all, and there was no suggestion that for any omission in keeping hydrants, valves or
pipes in repair the people of the city could recover fire damages
to their property.
''.An intention to impose upon the city the crushing burden
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of such an obligation should not be imputed to the Legislature
in the absence of language clearly designed to have that
effect.''
As further support for its conclusion as to the city's nonliability under the described circumstances, the court referred
to the "controlling" decision in Mock Co. v. Rensselaer Water
Co., 247 N.Y. 160 [159 N.E. 896, 62 A.L.R. 1199], where a
private vvater company, under ''a positive statutory duty''
to supply water to a city, was charged with the "failure to
furnish sufficient water under adequate pressure to extinguish
the fire before it reached plaintiffs' [property]." As said in
the Steitz opinion (64 N.E.2d at p. 707), the court in the
Moch case held that "the action could not be maintained for
a tort at common law or for a breach of statutory duty because the duty was owing to the city and not to its inhabitants
and because the failure to furnish an adequate supply of
water was at most the denial of a benefit and was not the
commission of a wrong.'' Accordingly, the court in the Steitz
case refused to construe the statutory waiver of sovereign
immunity to contemplate the imposition of a greater liability
on the city than would exist against an individual or private
corporation charged with like negligence for failure to maintain its fire-extinguishing paraphernalia in usable condition.
[5] When the Public Liability Act was enacted in 1923,
there were several decisions in this state dealing with the
question of the liability of private water companies. Thus
it had been held that neither a city (Ukiah v. Ukiah Water
& Imp. Co., 142 Cal. 173 [75 P. 773, 100 Am.St.Hep. 107, 64
L.R.A. 231]) nor a private citizen (Niehaus Bros. Co. v. Contra
Costa Water Co., 159 Cal. 305 [113 P. 375, 36 L.R.A. N.S.
1045]) could recover damages from a water company for a
property loss by fire due to the company's failure to maintain
its water system properly. In the light of these decisions,
of which the Legislature presumably had knowledge (23 Cal.
Jur. § 159, p. 782; JJf1:ller v. McColgan, 17 Cal.2d 432, 439
[110 P.2d 419, 134 A.L.R 1424]), it does not seem reasonable
to construe the Public Liability Act as intended to impose a
greater liability on the city than would prevail against an
individual or a private corporation charged with negligence
in the administration of its fire protection. (See Watson v.
City of Alameda, 219 Cal. 331, 333 [26 P.2d 286] ; People v.
S1.tperior Court, 29 Cal.2d 754,757 [178 P.2d 1] .) The "crushing burden of such an obligation" will not be "imputed to the
Legislature in the absence of language clearly designed to have
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that effect." (Steitz v. City of Beacon, supra, 64 N.E.2d
704, 707.) We find no language clearly designed to have
that effect in the cited Public Liability Act of 1923.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J.,
concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
Briefly, the question presented here is whether a municipal
corporation is liable under our Public Liability Act (Gov.
Code, § 53051) for the destruction by fire of plaintiff's home,
by reason of its water main and hydrant used for fire protection becoming clogged, thus making it impossible to obtain
sufficient water to quench the fire. The majority holds that
the case does not come within that act. Certain principles
are conceded: (1) That the city's fire prevention function is
governmental rather than proprietary, and that in the absence
of a statute there is no liability for a tort committed in the
course of that activity by reason of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity; (2) that the liability act includes governmental
as well as proprietary activities; ( 3) that the liability act
covers cases where the injured person is using the dangerous
or defective city property and also where the city is using its
propedy or works and injury is proximately caused thereby;
( 4) that the choked hydrant constituted a dangerous and
defective condition in the city's property known by the city
to exist; ( 5) that funds were available to repair said hydrant;
( 6) and that such condition was the proximate cause of the
destruction of plaintiff's house by. fire.
How then does the majority reach the conclusion that the
case is not covered by the Public Liability Act f The real
basis appears to be that to apply it here would impose a
"crushing burden" upon the city. Formally the decision is
founded upon the reasoning that there was no liability at
common law-no duty of care upon one, public or private,
supplying water for extinguishing fires, to the inhabitants
of the city. That reasoning appears chiefly from the cases
of Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51 [64 N.E.2d 704, 163
A.L.R. 342], and Mach Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y.
160 [159 N.E. 896, 62 A.L.R. 1199] relied upon and quoted
in the majority opinion. In the Steitz case the statute involved
was not a public liability act; it was nothing more than a
waiver of sovereign immunity-of the privilege not to be
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sued. Hence the court could not find a duty imposed upon
the city to keep its property reasonably safe, from the mere
statutory obligation of a city to supply fire protection, and
none flowed from a. mere permission to be sued. There is
further discussion in the same tenor, emphasis being laid on
the governmental character of a city's obligation to furnish
protection against fire. That argument is, of course, wholly
beside the point, because the obligation is here imposed by the
Public Liability Act to maintain all city property, whether used
govet·nmentally or not, in a safe condition.
The complete answer to all that discussion is that it is not
the obligation of the city to maintain a fire department from
which flows the duty to maintain its property in a safe condition. It is the liability act itself. This act constitutes more
than a mere waiver of sovereign immunity which the court considered in the Steitz case. No exceptions are provided in this
act. It says that cities shall be liable for any injuries to any
person or property resulting from the dangerous or defective
condition of its property or works. If there is a liability for
such condition, there must necessarily be included therein a
duty to maintain its property in a safe condition-a duty to all
persons and to all owners of any property that may be injured
by a breach of that duty, including inhabitants as well as
others. The cases have uniformly held that the Public Liability
Act created and imposed a duty upon the public agencies
named to maintain their works and property in a nondangerous
and nondefective condition, which is not affected or controlled
by the common law. It is said in the first case decided by this
court which considered the act : ''The legislature has removed
from the consideration of the case all common law and archaic
obstacles that formerly stood in the way of a citizen recovering from a municipality damages for personal injuries
suffered from dangerous and defective conditions of public
streets, by adopting in 1923 ( Stats. 1923, p. 675), the following
act . . . the obligation of a city to make its highways reasonably safe for general use cannot be chartered away even
though a municipality should attempt to do so." (Rafferty
v. City of Marysville, 207 Cal. 657, 660 [280 P. 118] .) The
District Court of Appeal in discussing the title of the act
said:" [T]he second part [of the act], as the title also indicates, creates an entirely new and different liability, to wit: the
liability of the county,-making the county a legal entity, liable
for the negligence of its officers in certain cases." (Italics by
the court.) (Gorman v. County of Sacramento, 92 Cal.App.
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656, 668 [268 P. 1083].) In dealing with the then section
1623 of the Political Code imposing liability on school districts for negligence the same as the Public Liability Act, this
court said it (section 1623) "creates a liability on the the part
of school districts for damages . . . by reason of the negli(Ahern v. Livermore
gence of the school district . . . . "
Union High Sch. Dist., 208 Cal. 770, 782 [284 P. 1105].)
We said in Fackrell v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal.2d 196, 209
[157 P.2d 625, 158 A.L.l~. 625] : "Obviously, the city is not
being held as an insurer of anything but it is being held to
the standard of ordinary care in planning, constructing, and
maintaining its streets and sidewalks. Liability for its failure
in that regard is not due to the whimsy of court or jury; it is
imposed by the public liability statute . . . . It now seeks to
justify its conduct by announcing for itself a rule that it
assumes no responsibility for the condition of the sidewalk
and that pedestrians must use the same at their own risk.
But its legal dtdy in the premises is defined by general law
(Stats. 1923, p. 675; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1944, Act 5619)
and negligence and liability therefor do not depend upon, and
cannot be limited by, self-formulated standards." (Italics
added.) This court discusses the question in detail in (Jibs on
v. County of Mendocino, 16 Cal.2d 80, 84 [105 P.2d 105], in
determining that the common law rules of liability were not
applicable: ''In effect, it has been held that the rules with
respect to the measure of care to be exercised by owners of
private property toward invitees and licensees have no application to the duty imposed by the stat1tte on a county, municipality or school district to maintain public property in a safe
condition. Thus, in the case of Castro v. S1dter Creek U. II.
S. Dist., 25 Cal.App.2d 372, 377 [77 P.2d 509], where the
issues involved the applicability of the same section of the act
here concerned, the plaintiff, who had accompanied her two
daughters to a dance held at an auditorium belonging to a
school district, was shown to have received an injury because
of having stepped into a hole as she was 'crossing over' a
parkway or strip of land lying between the sidewalk and the
curving adjoining a driveway which extended along the south
side of the auditorium, which strip of land was owned by tbe
school district, but was intended to be used only as a lawn
plot or place for the planting of trees. In that case, where
arguments were directed to the question whether at the time of
the accident the injured person was a licensee or an invitee,
the court ruled that the answer to that question was im-
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material and not determinative of the liability of the defendants. The provisions of the section were there set forth to
the effect that a county, municipality or school district is
liable for injuries to persons and property resulting proximately from the dangerous or defective condition of public
buildings, grounds, etc., in all cases where the government
or managing board of such school district, county, municipality
or person having authority to remedy such condition, had
knowledge or notice of the defective or dangerous condition
of any such buildings, grounds, etc., and within a reasonable
time after acquiring such knowledge had failed to remedy such
condition. The court in that case said that the provisions of
the section 'base liability upon any act which leaves a place
or condition dangerous or defective and liable to cause some
injury to the general public', and that the section was 'designed not for the safety, particularly, either of licensees or
invitees. . . . ' ''
There being a duty thus established by the liability act,
there remains no reason why the act should not apply to this
case.
Reliance is placed by the majority, however, on cases decided before the 1923 liability act, which it says hold that
neither a city nor an individual could recover from a water
company for a property loss by fire due to the company's
failure to maintain its water system properly (Ukiah v. Ukiah
Water & Imp. Co., 142 Cal. 173 [75 P. 773, 100 Am.St.Rep.
107, 64 L.R.A. 231]; Nichatts Bros Co. v. Contra Costa Water
Co., 159 Cal. 305 [113 P. 375, 36 L.R.A. N.S. 1045]) and
that the Legislature did not intend to abrogate that rule when
it adopted the Public Liability Act. 'l'he latter premise is at
least dubious for there are no except1:ons in the scope of the
liability act. It does not say that it is right for the city to
maintain dangerous and defective property used for fire
fighting. In any event, these cases are clearly wrong. The
inaccuracy of those cases is ably pointed out in referring to
Mach Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., snpra, 247 N.Y. 160 [159
N.E. 896, 62 .A.I•. R. 1199] : " . . . Cardozo speaks of the
failure of the water company as if it were merely a failure to
confer a benefit upon the injured householder, and in denying
liability relies upon the recognized principle that one is under
no duty to confer a benefit upon another. Of course, the
plaintiff did not complain of the failure to receive a benefit.
His real ground was that, because of reliance upon the undertaking of the water company to maintain an adequate pressure
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at the hydrants, the city had failed to make other provision
for the protection of its citizens, and the plaintiff, among
others, being lulled into a false sense of security, had failed
individually to take measures to protect his property. In
substance, the situation does not differ from that where a
train cuts a fire hose or blocks a street, so that the fire department cannot extinguish a fire. In both cases the defendant
has prevented a third person from rendering assistance.
Where the act is after the beginning of the fire, there is an
immediacy of need which does not exist in the waterworks
situation, yet since it is well known that fires occur from
time to time in any town large enough to afford waterworks,
there would seem to be such a substantial risk of harm to the
group of which the plaintiff is one as would make such cases
directly in point. The risk to the individual plaintiff is less,
but the chance of harm to any one of a large number is great.
Furthermore, in the Moch case, it was alleged that the defendant had failed to keep up the pressure after knowing of
the fire. It had been held before the Moch case, as it has
been held since, that the negligent breaking of a water
main may be the basis of a cause of action in favor of a
householder who had been thereby deprived of the assistance
of the fire department in quenching a fire. Analogous are the
cases where a railroad has undertaken more than its legal
duty in supplying at a railroad crossing a watchman upon
whose presence travelers frequently using the crossing have
relied, and those where an agent in charge of a building has
failed to keep it in repair, as a result of which a third person
is injured. In these cases where the wrong consists of a
failure to act, the older viewpoint was that since there is
mere 'nonfeasance' and no direct obligation to the injured
person, there can be no liability to him. The fallacy of this
older point of view has been today generally exploded . . . . "
(Cardozo and the Law of Torts, Professor Warren A.. Seavey,
52 Harv.L.Rev., 372, 392.) Many more illustrations may
be added to those suggested by Professor Seavey. The firefighting equipment may be maintained in a dangerous and
defective condition with full knowledge of the city officialsbrakes on the automotive equipment may be defectivefire hoses may be defective and burst when water is run
through them under pressure-hydrants may be broken off or
burst from freezing and no effort made to repair them until
water discharging therefrom damages private property. The
liability aet was obviously intended to apply to situations such
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as these. If such dangerous and defective conditions result
in loss or damage to property by fire, why should it not be
applied to extend protection to a person so damaged? To
my mind there is no basis in reason, logic or common sense for
the construction placed upon said act by the majority. Under
the facts alleged in the complaint and not denied, plaintiffs
lost their home as the direct and proximate result of the
dangerous, defective and unsafe condition of the fire hydrant
which was known by the city officials to exist and they failed
to cause said condition to be repaired although funds were
available for such purpose.
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment.
SCHAUER, Dissenting.-I concur in the reasoning and conclusion of Justice Carter.
I think the Public Liability Act (Stats. 1923, ch. 328, § 2, p.
675) covers this case. The majority seek to distinguish the
111any cases upholding and applying that statute by stating
that ( p. 489) : "The ordinary case coming within the terms
of this act involves a situation where the injured person is
using some type of city property that is dangerous or defective, and which he had a legal right to use, [citations and
illustrations, such as using a defectively engineered or maintained street] . . . Likewise the act sustains the imposition
of liability in the situation where the city is using the dangerous or defective property and injury was proximately caused
thereby . . . [citations and illustrations, such as negligently
using defective sewer pipe and negligently maintaining street
drainage facilities, contributing to the flooding of plaintiffs'
property]. But here the city did not create the fire causing
the damage to plaintiffs' property."
It seems to me that the attempted differentiation is not
legally sound or substantial. I would think that a householder is "using" a fire hydrant and water supply when he,
by himself or a city employe, attaches a hose to it· and runs
the water to put out an incipient fire in his house. Surely that
is a legal use of a facility for which as a taxpayer he is
paying. Likewise, the fire department men, and through them,
the city, are "using" that property when they connect the
hose and run the water. And the defective condition of the
fire hydrant just as surely contributes, under the circumstances shown here, proximately to cause the damage to
plaintiffs' property by fire as does defective sewer pipe or
drainage facilities contribute to cause damage in time of
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flood. The majority say "the city did not create the fire
causing the damage'' ; I point out that in the flood cases
the city did not create the water which caused the damage,
nor even the law of gravity which impels water to seek a lower
level by a direct route.
It is just as much a natural result for a fire, not extinguished,
to consume a house built of combustible materials as it is for
flood waters, not diverted or safely carried away, to damage
property, subject to erosion or seepage, which lies in their
path. Sewers are maintained to (among other uses) safely
carry away flood waters; water mains and fire hydrants are
maintained to (among other uses) extinguish fires. A. householder in a city pays taxes to obtain, among other things, fire
protection as well as flood protection. The Public Liability
Act imposes tort liability on the city for negligently maintaining its property in a defective condition when such condition proximately causes damage while the property is being
lawfully used for its designed purpose. All the conditions
for liability imposed by the statute are met here.
This court has been liberal (sometimes, I have felt, more
than liberal) in construing statutes and the common law to
advance the outposts of tort liability as against private citizens and private corporations. 1 I think that such liberality
of extension-in this case an obviously discretionary interpretation and application of the statute-should more justly
be indulged as against the state and municipal corporations
than as against private individuals and corporations.
I should reverse the judgment.

1
See e.g-.: Hunt v. A1lthier (1946), 28 Cal.2d 288 [169 P.2d 913, 171
A.L.R. 18"i9]; .Johnston v. Long (194'1), 30 Oal.:?d 54, ill [181 P.2d 64!)];
Ra/Jer v. '1'1m~in (19;)1), 36 Cal.2d 654 [226 P.2d 574]; Pete1·son v. Burk·
halter (Hl.i~), B.'\ Cal.2d 107. 114 1237 P.2d 977]; srcc, also, Rippe v.
City of Los Angeles (HJ42), 50 Cal.App.2d 189 [123 P.2d 47].

